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THE REGULATION OF LABOR AND THE
RELEVANCE OF LEGAL ORIGIN
David E. Pozen†
Arguably the most important social science research of the past
decade has centered on comparative law and economics. In a
celebrated series of articles, the economists Rafael La Porta,
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and intermittent
collaborators have explored empirically how a country’s legal origin—
English common law, French civil law, Germanic code, Scandinavian
law, or Soviet socialist law—affects its subsequent institutional and
economic development. The common law emerges as the hero of this
analysis: Compared with other countries and especially with civil law
countries, common law bearers have, ceteris paribus, better legal
protection of shareholders and creditors;1 greater judicial
independence and economic freedom;2 less formalized, shorter, fairer,
more consistent dispute resolution procedures;3 less politicized law
enforcement;4 lower barriers to new business formation;5 and more
efficient bureaucracies.6 Taken together, these studies offer a
remarkably broad argument for the common law being a driver of, or
at least uniquely consonant with, good government. On the sweep
and strength of these findings, La Porta and colleagues have been
cited more times since 1997 than any other economists, and
policymakers worldwide have been scouring their articles for usable
insights.7

† J.D., Yale Law School, expected 2007. I thank Patrick Bayer, John Donohue, Joshua
Kleinfeld, David Love, Michelle Messer, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.
1. Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) [hereinafter La
Porta et al., Law and Finance]; Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance,
52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Legal Determinants].
2. Rafael La Porta et al., Judicial Checks and Balances, 112 J. POL. ECON. 445 (2004).
3. Simeon Djankov et al., Courts, 118 Q. J. ECON. 453 (2003).
4. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins, 117 Q. J. ECON. 1193 (2002).
5. Simeon Djankov et al., The Regulation of Entry, 117 Q. J. ECON. 1 (2002).
6. Rafael La Porta et al., The Quality of Government, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 222 (1999).
7. See Nicholas Thompson, Common Denominator, LEGAL AFF., Jan.–Feb. 2005, at 46
(profiling the authors, often referred to collectively as “LLSV,” and describing their impact).
LLSV’s law-and-finance scholarship has been particularly influential. See, e.g., John C. Coffee,
Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of
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In a new study entitled The Regulation of Labor, the authors
(with Juan Botero now headlining) push their research in a
provocative new direction.8 While their previous work had focused on
corporate law and on courts, here the authors investigate a novel
domain. Using original data compiled on eighty-five countries,
Botero and colleagues (Botero et al.) examine the historical
determinants of employment, collective relations, and social security
laws. They find that legal origin is a stronger predictor of all of these
than political or economic variables, with common law associated with
the lowest levels of regulation. Legal institutional theory, they
conclude, better explains the development of national labor laws than
political power or efficiency theories.
Moving labor market regulation from the left-hand to the righthand side of the equation, Botero et al. then show that heavier
regulation corresponds to lower labor force participation and higher
unemployment, especially for the young. Coupled with the legal
origins evidence, this result implies that the common law leads not
only to less intensive worker protection, but also to superior labor
market outcomes. The Regulation of Labor thus extends La Porta
and colleagues’ research in at least three significant ways, providing
further evidence of: (1) legal origin’s lasting and profound impact on
present-day outcomes, (2) the common law’s uniquely beneficent
effects, and (3) “regulatory complementarity,” whereby countries’
regulatory styles remain consistent across substantive areas of law.9
The study’s remarkable dataset and its anti-regulation conclusions,
meanwhile, may set the agenda for comparative labor law empirical
research for years to come.10
The problem, this paper will argue, is that The Regulation of
Labor’s methodological weaknesses severely undermine its putative
contributions. Many scholars have voiced concerns about La Porta

Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 3 n.2 (2001) (calling LLSV’s law-and-finance works
“seminal”); Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in Corporate Law Between the United States and
Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 697, 699 (2005) (same); Beth
Ahlering & Simon Deakin, Labour Regulation, Corporate Governance and Legal Origin: A
Case of Institutional Complementarity? 2 (European Corporate Governance Inst., Law Working
Paper No. 72/2006, 2005) (noting that LLSV’s research has “inform[ed] the policy and working
methods of the World Bank and other international financial institutions”).
8. Juan C. Botero et al., The Regulation of Labor, 119 Q. J. ECON. 1339 (2004).
9. This phrase comes from Shleifer himself. Casey B. Mulligan & Andrei Shleifer,
Conscription as Regulation, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 85, 87 (2005).
10. For examples of recent works that draw on Botero et al.’s data, see W.S. Siebert,
Labour Market Regulation: Some Comparative Lessons, 25 ECON. AFF. 3 (Sept. 2005); Ahlering
& Deakin, supra note 7; Davin Chor & Richard B. Freeman, The 2004 Global Labor Survey:
Workplace Institutions and Practices Around the World (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 11598, 2005).
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and colleagues’ econometric approach.11 I join this chorus and seek to
augment it by providing, in Sections I and II, one of the first
systematic methodological critiques of their study12 and by situating
this critique, in Section III, in the broader context of empirical legal
scholarship. My critique is able to avoid being highly technical
because the methodological problems here are fundamental.
Nevertheless, I write this paper not from a place of ressentiment, but
from a place of admiration; The Regulation of Labor, like all of these
authors’ works, is as impressive as it is important. More, it is a signal
example of the intertwined potentialities and problematics of
comparative law and economics.
I.

MEASUREMENT AND CODING

To be able to write The Regulation of Labor, Botero et al.
undertook a Herculean effort in creating their dataset. In addition to
culling a variety of political, economic, and legal variables from
preexisting sources—the legal origins classification scheme is carried
over from the authors’ previous articles—Botero et al. quantified for
the first time the labor laws of eighty-five countries across more than
sixty dimensions. The authors group each labor-law variable (e.g.,
percentage of net salary covered by sickness benefits for a two-month
sickness spell) into a sub-index (e.g., sickness and health benefits), and
then group each sub-index into one of three indices (employment
laws, collective relations laws, or social security laws) meant to
summarize the overall stringency of a country’s regulations.13 All
variables are normalized to values between zero and one; the subindex values are computed as the mean of the sub-index’s variables;
and the index values are computed as the mean of the index’s sub11. See Thompson, supra note 7, at 46 (summarizing the concerns). The bulk of the
methodological criticisms have targeted LLSV’s law-and-finance research, see, e.g., Thorsten
Beck & Ross Levine, Legal Institutions and Financial Development 16–20 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 10126, 2003), and so are only partially apposite here.
12. This appears to be the first commentary devoted wholly to The Regulation of Labor. I
am aware of two other papers that offer sustained critiques: Beth Ahlering and Simon Deakin
examine the validity of Botero et al.’s labor law measures and argue that the study, like the rest
of “the legal origin literature[,] relies upon an overly reductive understanding of the common
law/civil law divide,” Ahlering & Deakin, supra note 7, at 43, while Davin Chor and Richard
Freeman compare the results obtained from their Global Labor Survey with the Botero et al.
indices, Chor & Freeman, supra note 10. Both of these critiques are stimulating and valuable,
and provide deeper analysis of measurement issues than I do here. My aim in this paper is to
point out some additional reasons for skepticism about The Regulation of Labor’s design and
results.
13. The article itself spends nineteen pages explaining the data, Botero et al., supra note 8,
at 1346–64, and the dataset is downloadable from Andrei Shleifer’s Web page,
http://www.andrei-shleifer.com/data.html.
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indices.
These variables reflect formal legal rules—labor law
statutes—as they apply to a standardized male worker and a
standardized employer.14 They are coded such that higher values
correspond to more extensive worker protection, with 1.00 indicating
maximal protection. Except for a few civil rights measures derived
from U.S. State Department, U.S. Department of Labor, and
International Labor Organization reports, the authors themselves
created and coded all of their dependent variables.
For their independent variables, the authors cull from a variety of
data sources. Their preferred political orientation variables, for
example, draw on multiple compendia to record the fraction of years
during 1928–1995 and 1975–1995 when a country’s chief executive and
its legislature were both of “leftist” or “centrist” orientation.15 (What
it means to be leftist or centrist, or how this was calculated, is never
explained, in the text or the data appendix.) Other independent
variables measure for each country: 1997 per capita income; average
years of schooling for the population over twenty-five years of age;
union density; average levels of autocracy and democracy between
1950 and the 1990s; and the degree to which governments were
divided and proportionally representative from 1975 to 1995.
I provide this sketch of Botero et al.’s data because they are at
once the major strength and the major weakness of the paper. They
are the major strength for obvious reasons: By quantifying so many
aspects of so many countries’ labor laws, the data enable an empirical
analysis of worker protections that is by far the most comprehensive
on record.16 The cost of this great breadth, however, is a loss of
confidence that the data actually represent what they are supposed to.
14. Botero et al., supra note 8, at 1346, 1353. Among other qualities, the standardized
worker is married with two children, lives in the country’s most populous city, is not a member of
a voluntary labor union, and belongs to the majority race and religion; while the standardized
employer is a domestically-owned manufacturing company located in the country’s most
populous city, has 250 workers, and offers workers no more protections than what is legally
mandated. Id. at 1353 n.6.
15. Data sources for these two variables include World Bank reports, political
encyclopedias, online databases, and unspecified “various regional and country sources.” Data
Appendix, Variable Definitions, available at http://www.andrei-shleifer.com/data.html.
16. Compare Botero et al., supra note 8, with Giuseppe Nicoletti & Frederic L. Pryor,
Subjective and Objective Measures of the Extent of Governmental Regulations (AEI-Brookings
Joint Ctr., 2001) (reviewing three recent quantitative studies measuring the extent of regulation
in OECD countries). The Global Labor Survey dataset is similarly ambitious in scope, see Chor
& Freeman, supra note 10, but its variables tend to be more opinionative and impressionistic,
they cover only thirty-three countries, and they have not yet, as far as I know, been subjected to
the same sort of econometric analysis. The 1994 OECD Jobs Study and follow-on reports have
analyzed the economic impact of labor market regulations at great depth, but only for a much
narrower set of regulations. See, e.g., ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, THE OECD JOBS STUDY: EVIDENCE AND EXPLANATIONS: PART 1: LABOUR
MARKET TRENDS AND UNDERLYING FORCES OF CHANGE (1994).
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Validity slippage could occur on several levels—and mar the study’s
results twice over, because labor regulation is used as both a
dependent and independent variable.17 First, Botero et al.’s exclusive
reliance on formal legal rules might fail to capture functional
outcomes. Botero et al. acknowledge this evident concern and take
some steps to mitigate it, but they overlook the possibility that
enforcement of and compliance with labor laws vary systematically
across countries.18 For example, compliance and enforcement rates
may be positively correlated with, and to some extent caused by, the
wealth and institutional maturity of a jurisdiction, the longevity of a
law’s existence, and the degree of a law’s compatibility with social
norms—all of which are likely to be lower for developing countries as
compared to developed countries with respect to labor regulations.
Compliance will also likely be weaker in the presence of strict
regulation.19 Validity is further attenuated by Botero et al.’s failure to
distinguish between mandatory, default, and optional rules—
presumably they coded for default rules—which both magnifies the de
jure/de facto cleavage and leaves their variables underspecified.20
The Regulation of Labor’s coding scheme exacerbates a second
and even more basic concern: the inherent subjectivity in translating
statutory provisions (not to mention functional outcomes) into
numerical scores. It is easy to dispute, for instance, a “dismissal
procedures” sub-index that gives New Zealand a score of 0.14 and

17. Botero et al., supra note 8, at tbls.2-5, tbl.8.
18. Botero et al. find this concern minor because they include some rough controls for
enforcement quality, because labor law is primarily statute-based (a claim challenged in
Ahlering & Deakin, supra note 7, at 17), and because several of the sub-indices are constructed
to reflect actual economic costs, not just statutory language. Botero et al., supra note 8, at 1347.
It should be noted that economists, including labor economists, routinely measure enforcement
levels. See, e.g., Rita Almeida & Pedro Carneiro, Enforcement of Labor Regulation, Informal
Labor, and Firm Performance (World Bank, Pol’y Research Working Paper No. 3756, 2005)
(measuring labor-law enforcement in Brazil).
Chor and Freeman’s Global Labor Survey, “an Internet-based survey designed to
collect information on the state of workplace practices from labor experts and practitioners
around the world,” Chor & Freeman, supra note 10, at 3, bypasses formal legal rules altogether
in pursuit of functional knowledge on labor regulation. The Global Labor Survey indices are
consistent with the rankings of Botero et al., but the correlations are not particularly tight,
especially in the area of collective relations. See id. at 21 & n.24, 42 tbl.8. Chor and Freeman
“attribute part of this to the fact that Botero et al. measure de jure labor regulations, which will
inevitably diverge from de facto workplace practices,” and part of it to “differences in the
component questions that underlie the two [studies’] measures.” Id. at 21-22.
19. See Norman V. Loayza et al., The Impact of Regulation on Growth and Informality:
Cross-Country Evidence (World Bank, Pol’y Research Working Paper No. 3623, 2005).
20. Holger Spamann and others have critiqued LLSV’s failure to distinguish between
mandatory, default, and optional rules in their law-and-finance scholarship. See Holger
Spamann, On the Insignificance and/or Endogeneity of La Porta et al.’s “Anti-Director Rights
Index” Under Consistent Coding 6-8 (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Harvard Law
Sch., Discussion Paper No. 67, 2006); id. at 4 n.7 (providing further citations).
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Portugal a score of 0.71. Portugal may have more stringent dismissal
procedures than New Zealand, but are its procedures really five times
as stringent? Because Botero et al.’s variables are unique, there is
neither an independent check on their accuracy, nor any good way to
quantify their measurement error. And what does it even mean to
have dismissal procedures that are five times as stringent as those of
another country? Because Botero et al. never provide a theory of
labor regulation to undergird their coding decisions, this ratio is
essentially arbitrary. In multiple senses, then, The Regulation of
Labor’s data may be subject to greater uncertainty than the labor law
data generated through the repeated, systematic efforts of groups like
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) and the World Bank.21
A third cluster of data limitations involves Botero et al.’s method
of indexing their worker-protectiveness scores. This indexing loses
potentially interesting information about individual laws. It imposes
an awkward commensurability across a wide range of legal protections
that influence different workers in different countries in different
ways. It unrealistically assumes that these protections operate
independently of each other, such that countries do not substitute
between, say, employment law and trade unions, and employees do
not experience multiplicative returns on the simultaneous
presence/absence or generosity/stinginess of different protections.22
And its use of averages masks substantial variability within both the
sub-indices and the indices,23 which would be especially unfortunate if
any sub-indices correlate across countries in ways that diverge from
their indices.24 Compounding the artificiality of the indexing method,

21. It is thus a promising development that the World Bank has apparently resolved to
update and expand on some of Botero et al.’s formal measures in its Doing Business database.
See World Bank, Doing Business Database, http://www.doingbusiness.org.
22. Sanford Jacoby contends such substitution is likely to happen. Sanford M. Jacoby,
Economic Ideas and the Labor Market: Origins of the Anglo-American Model and Prospects for
Global Diffusion, 25 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 43, 69 n.60 (2003).
23. As an illustration of this concern, Greece and Argentina have aggregate social security
index scores—used by Botero et al. as a dependent variable in all regressions—that, at 0.74 and
0.72 respectively, are quite similar. Their sub-index scores, however, betray significant
differences in their social security systems: Greece’s scores for “old age, disability and death
benefits,” “sickness and health benefits,” and “unemployment benefits” are 0.70, 0.78, and 0.74,
while Argentina’s comparable scores are 0.37, 0.94, and 0.84. Data Appendix, supra note 15.
One would never know from the countries’ index scores that Greece has a consistently generous
social security system across all dimensions, whereas Argentina has a highly generous system
with respect to health and unemployment benefits but a rather uncharitable system with respect
to old age, disability, and death benefits.
24. Although sub-indices are generally correlated with other sub-indices from the same
index, Botero et al., supra note 8, at tbl.II, this possibility remains. Botero et al. helpfully include
the sub-indices as dependent variables in Table IV, but nowhere else.

POZENARTICLE28-1.DOC

2006]

2/16/2007 2:53:58 PM

RELEVANCE OF LEGAL ORIGIN

49

Botero et al.’s exclusive focus on standardized workers and employers
elides any within-country variability that exists across industry sector,
region, age, gender, race, marital status, and the like.
The above data concerns are substantial, yet The Regulation of
Labor—and arguably all of the authors’ legal origins work—is beset
by two other data concerns still more fundamental: the possibility of
miscoding and a lack of transparency. La Porta and colleagues have
already been charged with misclassifying certain countries’ legal
typology.25 Others have argued that “transplant” countries, which
received their legal systems through conquest or colonization, follow
systematically different paths of legal evolution than “origin”
countries, irrespective of legal family.26 Still others have found
regional patterns in legal evolution not captured by the authors’
framework.27 The Regulation of Labor is vulnerable to each of these
criticisms, and also to criticisms of its worker-protection
characterizations. “[A] labor scholar would immediately notice that
there might be some problem in the construction of [the study’s]
indices,” Sanford Jacoby points out, “because the industrial relations
regime in Canada is coded as less ‘pro-worker’ than that of the United
States.”28 Indeed, in direct conflict with this result, the OECD
recently gave Canada a significantly higher rating than the United
States on overall “employment protection legislation” for each of the
past three decades.29
The potential for such miscoding here, it is important to stress, is
not just a function of the inevitable messiness of quantifying complex
real-world phenomena; it is also a function of process and subjectmatter competence. Because Botero et al. did not use survey data or,
for the most part, objective measures, nearly all of The Regulation of
Labor’s data values reflect the authors’ judgment calls. It would take

25. Mark West, for instance, has ridiculed the coding of Japan as a Germanic-code country.
See Thompson, supra note 7, at 46.
26. See Daniel Berkowitz et al., Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect,
47 EUR. ECON. REV. 165 (2003) [hereinafter Berkowitz et al., Economic Development]; Daniel
Berkowitz et al., The Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163 (2003) [hereinafter Berkowitz et
al., Transplant Effect].
27. See Katharina Pistor et al., The Evolution of Corporate Law: A Cross-Country
Comparison, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 791 (2002).
28. Jacoby, supra note 22, at 69 n.60. In a similar vein, Spamann and others have argued
that there is “strong and systematic measurement error” in LLSV’s coding of shareholder
protection rules. Spamann, supra note 20, at 1; accord Cools, supra note 7. When Spamann
recoded LLSV’s Antidirector Rights Index, this time with the help of local lawyers, nearly all of
the results from LLSV’s famous Law and Finance paper, La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra
note 1, ceased to be statistically significant.
29. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD
EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK 2004, at 117 tbl.2.A2.4 (2004).
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an astonishing facility with international labor law (and foreign
languages) to accurately discern the worker protectiveness of sixtyplus regulatory fields across eighty-plus countries. Yet no one of the
authors is a labor law scholar, much less a global authority.30 It is
therefore particularly jarring that Botero et al. do not give readers a
reasonable explanation of how they constructed their data or how to
replicate their process.31 The dataset may ultimately prove as
unreliable as it may prove invalid.
II. OMITTED VARIABLES, AHISTORICITY, AND ENDOGENEITY
Even assuming, arguendo, that Botero et al.’s data represent with
perfect fidelity the state of each country’s labor regulations,
functionally as well as formally, The Regulation of Labor would still
not be able to generate meaningful causal conclusions on legal origins.
As in the authors’ related work, this study’s legal origins inquiry
proceeds from a clever insight: Because most countries in the world
received their legal typology by transplant and never changed it
thereafter, their legal origins are exogenous to their economies. This
offers the researcher a natural experiment.
Yet that same colonial genesis also means that a country’s legal
typology is part of a larger socio-historical package, which creates a
tangle of econometric problems. First, because countries within a
legal family tend to share so many extralegal commonalities—
historical, linguistic, geographical, cultural—all of which might
plausibly influence regulation-setting and none of which are
controlled for (apart from a few cultural variables used in unreported
regressions), Botero et al. cannot identify the effects attributable
specifically to legal origins.32 For all the authors’ codificatory
ambition, the dataset remains ironically impoverished. This omitted
variables problem is compounded by the problem of time. Botero et

30. The extent to which Botero et al. collaborated with foreign lawyers, labor law scholars,
or international research bodies is not made clear in the article or the data appendix. Whatever
form this collaboration might have taken, one assumes that Botero et al. made all the coding
decisions themselves. Enlisting the help of local experts can be an effective, if resourceintensive, way to help comparative researchers understand foreign legal systems; but it is no
panacea for measurement error. See Spamann, supra note 20, at 21 (discussing the benefits and
drawbacks of cross-country collaboration).
31. Cf. Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 86, 103
(2002) (emphasizing the importance of clear coding and data-generation instructions). Botero et
al. promise “a full description of all variables and the data” in the online appendix, Botero et al.,
supra note 8, at tbl.1, but the appendix says little on coding and nothing on the data-generation
process.
32. Note in this regard the euphemistic quality of “transplant,” and how the term serves to
dull and obscure the underlying historical narrative.
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al.’s cross-sectional approach examines different countries’ regulations
at a single point in time, 1997, and tells us nothing about how labor
laws evolve. This ahistoricity fails to capture any intertemporal
patterns or fluctuations in the data, and therefore further erodes the
ability to draw causal inferences.33 Panel data analysis may not have
been a viable alternative because the fixed effects would have wiped
out the legal origins results. But if Botero et al. had run their crosssectional regressions for more than just 1997, it would have at least
shed some light on the results’ sensitivity to the choice of a reference
year.
There is, moreover, a problem at the level of theory. Although
many hypotheses have been proffered on how different legal
traditions might influence regulation34—most notably accounts of how
common law yields more contractarian, less regulated societies—
Botero et al. never actually specify the mechanisms through which
legal origins determine regulatory outcomes.35 Even more so than the
typical cross-sectional study, The Regulation of Labor’s results are
unlikely to be robust to alternative specifications, time periods, or
explanatory variables. Unadjusted R² values in the 0.19 to 0.64 range,
trumpeted by Botero et al. in the text, do nothing to allay these
problems.36
All of the previous two paragraphs’ criticisms can and have been
leveled, in scattered form, against these authors’ other legal origins
research;37 especially acute in The Regulation of Labor, however, is
33. Imagine, as a hypothetical, that leftist governments worldwide always enact highly
worker-friendly labor laws, whereas centrist and rightist governments always enact highly
worker-unfriendly laws. Now imagine two countries, A and B, where A had a leftist government
from 1928 to 1990 and then a centrist government afterwards, and B alternated between leftist
and rightist governments by decade, with rightists regaining power in the 1990s. Looking at 1997
labor laws, both A and B appear highly worker-unfriendly. Not only would Botero et al.’s static
analysis not capture the evolutionary discrepancies between A’s and B’s labor law systems; it
would also fail to identify leftist/centrist/rightist government orientation as the causal factor
driving these systems’ development.
34. Botero et al. summarize this literature in the article. Botero et al., supra note 8, at 1344–
46.
35. Nor do Botero et al. account for the substantial variability in worker protectiveness that
exists within legal families, as evident from the summary data in Table III. Italy and Burkina
Faso, for instance, both have French legal origins, but the former has an aggregate index score
((0.6499 + 0.6310 + 0.7572) / 3 = 0.68) almost twice as large as that of the latter ((0.4396 + 0.5258
+ 0.1447) / 3 = 0.37). Legal origins clearly are not too tight a straightjacket, or the whole story.
36. Botero et al., supra note 8, at 1365 (describing Table IV, the basic specification).
37. See, e.g., Beck & Levine, supra note 11, at 16–20 (summarizing and providing citations);
Jacoby, supra note 22, at 68–69 (critiquing The Regulation of Labor specifically); Daniel M.
Klerman & Paul G. Mahoney, The Value of Judicial Independence: Evidence from Eighteenth
Century England, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 2 (2005) (highlighting problems of theory and
under-parameterization). The most dramatic rebuttal belongs to Mark West, who regressed
countries’ World Cup soccer success against LLSV’s legal origins variables, and found French
legal origin and antidirector shareholder rights to have statistically significant positive

POZENARTICLE28-1.DOC

52

COMP. LABOR LAW & POL’Y JOURNAL

2/16/2007 2:53:58 PM

[Vol. 28:43

the additional problem of endogeneity.38 Botero et al.’s main findings
appear in Tables IV and VI, which show that relative to common law
origins, all other legal traditions have a statistically significant positive
relationship to worker protection levels on at least one index after
controlling for GNP per capita and “left power” variables, and in
Table VIII, which shows a negative, moderately significant
relationship between worker protection levels and desirable labor
market outcomes. There is potential endogeneity here because levels
of worker protection may influence levels of GNP, left power, and
labor market outcomes, rather than the other way around. (Indeed,
Table VIII broadcasts this possibility by implying that higher levels of
regulation lead to lower employment and therefore, presumably, to
lower GNP.)39 Or the variables may jointly determine one another.
Most of Botero et al.’s legal classifications go back hundreds of years
to the date of transplant, leaving a vast temporal expense in which
reciprocal causal iterations could have occurred. The key parameters,

coefficients, with an adjusted R² value of 0.41. Mark D. West, Legal Determinants of World Cup
Success tbl.1 (unpublished manuscript) (2002), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=318940.
West’s point, left implicit, was that these are spurious correlations; no one would seriously argue
that a country’s legal status or shareholder-rights regime determines soccer success. The causal
story linking legal origin to current worker-protection levels is admittedly more plausible, but it
too is severely attenuated.
38. Spamann also finds acute endogeneity problems in LLSV’s analysis of shareholder
protection rules. Spamann, supra note 20, at 28-34, 67.
39. In Table VIII, that is, Botero et al. take their article in a different direction, from
examining the determinants of labor regulations to examining the consequences of labor
regulations: “Outcomes,” this section is titled. Botero et al., supra note 8, at 1375. Against
measures of unofficial economy size, labor force participation, and unemployment (all of which
Botero et al. concede “have measurement problems,” id.), the authors run OLS regressions with
only average years of schooling and one of three labor law indices as independent variables. The
results vary somewhat across specifications, but in general they show a negative, moderately
significant relationship between worker protection levels and desirable labor market outcomes,
with stronger collective relations laws uniquely associated with a larger unofficial economy.
Unadjusted R² values range from 0.01 to 0.42. The omitted variables problem is especially acute
here, amounting almost to misspecification—does anyone believe that average years of
schooling and a single index of labor laws capture even a fraction of the forces that determine
labor market outcomes?—and there is a substantial endogeneity concern in that bad labor
market conditions might stimulate increased labor regulation. The problem of ahistoricity also
remains. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. Imagine if Botero et al. had run their crosssection analysis at a much earlier point in time, say 1900, before any of the relevant labor laws
and social security programs were in place. They would still find the common law countries to
be richer and to have lower unemployment, but the relevance of labor regulation to these
outcomes would obviously be nil.
Overall, Table VIII is too under-parameterized, too half-hearted an effort to offer
much, and only serves to deflect attention from Botero et al.’s primary arguments on the
determinants of labor laws. Its inclusion appears especially odd in light of the great body of
work that exists on the economic consequences of labor regulation. See, e.g., Botero et al., supra
note 8, at 1341 n.2 (citing representative examples); Richard B. Freeman, Labour Market
Institutions Without Blinders: The Debate over Flexibility and Labour Market Performance
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11286, 2005) (summarizing the recent
literature).
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and the model itself, are left unidentified. Along with the problems of
omitted variables, sequencing, and specification, endogeneity makes it
impossible to know whether legal origin is responsible for, not just
correlated with, present-day labor law and labor market outcomes.
The correlations are interesting, however, and in fact represent
the second major contribution of The Regulation of Labor after the
dataset itself (assuming it is at least moderately valid).40 In labor law
as in other areas, the common law tradition again emerges as
associated with significantly lower levels of regulation. At the end of
the article (Table VII), Botero et al. present pairwise correlations
between their three labor law indices and variables from their prior
studies reflecting the difficulty of starting a new business and the
formality of court proceedings.
The correlations are not
overwhelming, but they are generally positive and statistically
significant, leading Botero et al. to conclude that “[r]egulatory style is
pervasive across activities—consistent with the legal theory,” rather
than a political, economic, or cultural theory of regulatory
development.41 Although the data concerns outlined in Section I
demand caution, The Regulation of Labor’s broad results do deepen
Botero et al.’s descriptive case for regulatory complementarity.42
Common law origins may not in and of themselves determine today’s
outcomes, but with each new paper by these authors it becomes
harder to deny that the common law has a special affinity with more
informal and efficient regulation.
III. ON BEING PRODUCTIVELY REDUCTIVE
The Regulation of Labor’s strengths and weaknesses would be
notable in their own right, but they are especially notable because
they illuminate broader issues in these authors’ project and in
comparative law and economics more generally. Attempting to
compare legal provisions and identify causality across numerous
countries, over numerous years, is extremely difficult to do. Problems
with measurement and coding, omitted variables, time sequencing,
model specification, and endogeneity are endemic to the enterprise.
That these problems arise so dramatically in The Regulation of Labor
and its precursors reflects the ambition of the authors. To investigate
40. Cf. Ahlering & Deakin, supra note 7, at 25 (“[I]t is . . . possible that the index of Botero
et al., even based, as it is, on ‘law in the books,’ is a good, working proxy for the social effects of
laws. Perhaps more to the point, it is almost certainly the most rigorous and comprehensive one
that we currently have.”).
41. Botero et al., supra note 8, at 1375.
42. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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cross-country structural questions as they do, analytic precision must,
to an extent, be sacrificed. By contrast, economists investigating labor
laws have been able to generate much more robust results when they
confine themselves to within-country, cross-region variation, and add
a time-series element.43
So what usable insights can be gleaned from The Regulation of
Labor? For the policymaker, precious few. The article contains an
important normative element in its claim that heavier labor regulation
is associated with lower labor force participation and higher
unemployment; Table VIII’s prescriptive implications could be
summed up, it seems, by adding the letters De before regulation in the
title.44 But Table VIII is the least reliable and least original part of the
entire study.45 Botero et al. are more suggestive in their examination
of legal origins. But even if one believes their causal story and their
data, it would be enormously costly—in most cases, prohibitively
costly—to switch legal systems now from, say, civil to common law,
and nothing in their analysis suggests that such a switchover would
work.
For legal scholars, on the other hand, The Regulation of Labor
holds vast potential. The study’s sweeping characterization of
international labor regulations and its demonstration of their legaltypology correlations can frame almost any comparative labor law
inquiry. It is an extreme case of productively reductive research.
More nuanced comparativists, steeped in the histories and cultures of
their subjects, have in these authors’ work a reference point that is
becoming increasingly irresponsible to ignore. The possibilities for
fruitful syntheses between this research and more traditional, finergrained legal research are endless.

43. See, e.g., Timothy Besley & Robin Burgess, Can Labor Regulation Hinder Economic
Performance? Evidence from India, 119 Q. J. ECON. 91 (2004) (exploring variation across Indian
states to find that labor regulations have negative effects on employment, investment, and
productivity in manufacturing); David Card & Alan B. Krueger, Minimum Wages and
Employment: A Case Study of the Fast Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, 84 AMER.
ECON. REV. 772 (1994) (using a comparison with Pennsylvania to find no employment decline
caused by New Jersey’s minimum wage increase).
44. As readers of the Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal are no doubt already
aware, the issue of labor market deregulation is currently of intense interest in Western Europe.
Deregulation proposals in France and Germany have sparked heated debates—and, in France,
general strikes and mass protests. See Richard Bernstein, Political Paralysis: Europe Stalls on
Road to Economic Change, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2006, at A8; David Pozen, Blame It on
Globalization: West European Countries Need To Reform Their Welfare Policies for Domestic
Reasons, YALEGLOBAL, May 21, 2003, available at http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=
1663. In this sense, Botero et al.’s study appeared on the scene at an auspicious time for
influencing the policymaking process.
45. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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The limits of The Regulation of Labor, however, suggest two
preconditions for this potential to be realized in full. First, empirical
legal scholars who create new, non-survey datasets might be
encouraged to submit them to peer review before publishing analyses
based on the data. At present, no such first-order peer review exists.
To be sure, Botero et al. published their article in a top peer-reviewed
journal, the Quarterly Journal of Economics, and they published an
earlier version as a National Bureau of Economic Research working
paper.46 Yet these institutions are set up to vet authors’ manuscripts,
not necessarily their data collection and coding methods. (And the
typical student-run law review is not even set up to do the former
where sophisticated empirical scholarship is concerned.) A separate
body tasked specifically with reviewing datasets in its field could go a
long way toward rationalizing methodological debates, and would be
especially valuable when the data span multiple countries, as here.
A second suggestion is aimed at the level of the author, not the
academic infrastructure; it concerns presentation. Deirdre McCloskey
has, with brilliance and panache, been hammering the point for years
that despite its trappings of scientific precision, empirical economics
cannot provide certain answers.47 No one seriously disputes this, but
rhetorically, McCloskey also highlights, some imply otherwise.48 The
Regulation of Labor, like other works in La Porta and colleagues’
oeuvre, is selectively candid about its vulnerabilities. The article
would not leave an untrained reader with the understanding that it
demonstrates only correlation, never causation, and that even its
correlations are deeply disputable. To the contrary, its tone conveys
authoritativeness—from the conclusion: “There is, finally, strong
evidence that the origin of a country’s laws is an important
determinant of its regulatory approach, in labor as well as in other
markets. . . . . This evidence is broadly consistent with the legal
theory”49—while its title, like all the authors’ titles—Law and Finance,
Legal Origins, The Quality of Government, The Regulation of Labor—
conveys definitiveness, if not closure. La Porta and colleagues have
started much, as this paper explains, and they have good reason to
preen. But the regulation of labor is a vast subject, and their study
raises more questions than it answers.
46. Juan Botero et al., The Regulation of Labor (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 9756, 2003).
47. See generally DEIRDRE MCCLOSKEY, THE SECRET SINS OF ECONOMICS (2002);
DONALD N. MCCLOSKEY, KNOWLEDGE AND PERSUASION IN ECONOMICS (1994).
48. See DONALD N. MCCLOSKEY, THE RHETORIC OF ECONOMICS (1985); Donald N.
McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Law and Economics, 86 MICH. L. REV. 752 (1988).
49. Botero et al., supra note 8, at 1379.
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